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Pachur, Schooler, & Stevens
“Businessmen always meet twice in their lifetimes.”
Dictum of Zürich merchants in the 15th century
When Will We Meet Again?
Regularities of Social Connectivity As Reflected in Memory and Decision Making
Thorsten Pachur, Lael J. Schooler, & Jeffrey R. Stevens
Pachur, T, Schooler, L.J., & Stevens, J.R. (2012). When we meet again: Regularities in social 
contact dynamics reflected in memory and decision making. In R. Hertwig, U. Hoffrage, & 
the ABC Research Group (Eds.), Simple heuristics in a social world (pp. 199-224). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
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In 1967, the social psychologist Stanley Milgram reported a fascinating observation. For a 
study on social connectivity, he randomly picked several individuals in Wichita, Kansas, and 
asked them to get a message delivered to a particular target person in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts—a distance of more than 1,300 miles. There were two catches. First, Milgram 
provided no address but only the name and some basic information about the target person, 
such as the area where he lived and his profession (the target person was the same for 
everybody). Second, people could only forward the message to someone they knew on a first-
name basis. That is, the task for each person in the chain was to pass on the message to 
someone she thought would be most likely to know the target person or know someone else 
who might know him. The astonishing result was not only that many of the messages reached 
the target, but also that the number of intermediaries needed turned out to be rather small, 
ranging between 2 and 10 (with a median of 5).1 
Milgram’s (1967) findings became known as the small-world phenomenon or six-
degrees of separation because it takes six separate journeys to get from the sender to the target 
via five intermediaries. His results suggest that the social world possesses regularities that 
allow most people to reach any other person using a relatively small number of steps. 
Researchers have only recently begun to understand the nature of these regularities in greater 
detail. Watts and Strogatz (1998) identified conditions under which networks are both “small 
worlds”, in which the average number of connections between all agents in the network is 
rather low, and, at the same time, display tight clustering consisting of densely connected 
subgroups. Specifically, some connections must link members of a cluster to a randomly 
selected member from the entire network. Numerous investigations have followed, exploring 
the nature of social environments. 
Most studies of social networks have concentrated either on what we term “network 
structure”—the distribution of connections across members of a network (e.g., Watts, 2003)—
or on the size and hierarchical structure of social environments (e.g., Dunbar, 1992, 1998; Hill 
& Dunbar, 2003; Zhou, Sornette, Hill, & Dunbar, 2005). In our work, we will focus on less 
well-studied features of networks: how connection strengths—that is, how often one has 
contact with a particular person—are distributed across network members as well as the 
network contact dynamics to which the distributions give rise. Although it is usually not 
mentioned in discussions of the small-world phenomenon, Milgram (1967; see also Travers & 
Milgram, 1969) had already observed a particular structure in connection strength. 
Specifically, from the target person’s network members only very few served as the final step 
for transmitting the messages. In fact, from the 64 messages that the target person received, 
31 were transmitted through the same three network members—a very small number given 
that network analyses usually estimate the size of a person’s network to be 150 or higher (e.g., 
Killworth, Bernard, & McCarthy, 1984). In other words, the target person’s distribution of 
connection strengths was highly skewed. Here we examine more generally to what extent a 
skewed distribution characterizes social contacts. In addition, we explore how the probability 
of contact with another person from one’s social network can be predicted. In particular, we 
examine the relationship between aspects of past contact and the probability of future contact 
and how this relationship can be described mathematically. Our investigation is motivated by 
previous analyses suggesting that characteristic patterns of memory performance are 
paralleled by patterns in the environment (Anderson & Schooler, 1991). These analyses 
1 Milgram’s original empirical evidence can be criticized on various grounds. For instance, it could be objected 
that this figure is based on only the completed transmissions. However, an analysis considering all initiated 
transmissions yielded an only slightly higher estimate (Travers & Milgram, 1969). A number of further 
problematic aspects in Milgram’s original data were highlighted by Kleinfeld (2002). All these objections 
notwithstanding, Milgram’s finding of very short average path lengths was recently replicated in a large 
international study looking at email communication (Dodds, Muhamed, & Watts, 2003). 
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highlighted the role of frequency, recency, and the spacing of events for predicting both future 
events and memory performance. 
Do such patterns exist for social environments as well? The design underlying some 
communication systems seems to be based on the assumption that they do. In many types of 
email software, email addresses from one’s contacts are ordered by frequency of past 
contacts, assuming that most frequent previous contacts are most likely to be contacted in the 
future. Similarly, mobile phones allow for a quick access to the numbers of the most recent 
calls, implicitly assuming that these are also most likely to be used in the future. 
If statistical regularities between past and future contact indeed exist and if these 
regularities correspond to those found for memory retrieval, they might be important variables 
for studying and understanding aspects of social decision making, such as how well simple 
heuristics perform in a social world and how they might exploit memory retrieval. In the 
following, we report the results of an empirical study in which we found evidence for strong 
statistical regularities in human social contact. We then discuss the potential implications of 
the regularities for social decision making and how they might be exploited by simple 
heuristics, especially those associated with cooperation. Finally, we explore, based on a 
formal model of memory, to what extent the familiarity signal generated by traces of previous 
contacts can be used to reliably predict future social contact.
How the Past Predicts the Future: Three Regularities
Based on a mathematical model for patterns of library borrowing, Anderson and Milson 
(1989) developed a memory model that assumes that the availability of memory traces 
matches patterns in the traces’ previous retrieval needs. The key hypothesis underlying the 
model is that certain characteristic memory phenomena represent efficient responses to 
information that the cognitive system typically needs to retrieve. More specifically, the 
phenomenon that items are better recalled if they occurred more frequently or more recently 
reflect typical occurrence patterns in the environment. Moreover, if these occurrences were 
spaced over time relatively equally (rather than massed/clumped) one typically observes 
better recall at longer delays, but the reverse at shorter delays, where massed occurrences tend 
to produce better recall.  In a later set of ecological analyses, Anderson and Schooler (1991) 
provided support for this hypothesis. They demonstrated regularities between the probability 
of a certain word’s occurrence and the pattern of previous uses of the word in the headlines of 
the New York Times.
In addition—and crucial for the focus of this chapter—the results of another study in 
Anderson and Schooler (1991) hinted that such systematic relations might even exist in social 
contacts. Past social contact strongly predicted future contact in very specific ways. 
Analyzing three years’ worth of email received by John Anderson (JA), three regularities 
emerged relating to the frequency, recency, and spacing of contact. 
Frequency Effects
Anderson and Schooler (1991) first investigated how the frequency of past contacts 
influenced future contact. They found that the probability p of JA being contacted by someone 
on day t increased linearly with the number of days f on which he had been contacted by this 
person in the previous w days: p = b0 + b1f. In this equation, the intercept b0 represents your 
baseline social activity (i.e., the probability that a contact occurs with someone from your 
social network with whom there was no contact in the past w days); and b1 reflects the degree 
to which the probability increases with more frequent previous contacts. Thus, the probability 
of future contact increases proportionally with the frequency of previous contacts.
Recency Effects
Next, Anderson and Schooler (1991) tested how the time since last contact (recency) 
influenced future contact. Like frequency, recency strongly predicted future contact. 
Specifically, there was a power relation between the odds o = p/(1-p) that JA was contacted 
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by someone and the number of days r since his last contact with that person (on day t-r): o = 
b0r-α. Again, the intercept b0 in this equation represents baseline social activity. The parameter 
α reflects how quickly the probability of contact decreases as the number of days since the 
last contact increases. The power relation suggests that the odds of future contact decreases 
considerably with the time since last contact. If the last contact occurred very recently (e.g., 
yesterday), you are very likely to have contact with this person again soon. With less recent 
contact (e.g., several days ago), the probability of contact decreases dramatically. The power 
function also implies a scale-free relationship; that is, the probability of contact shows a 
similar pattern if recency is scaled in minutes, days, or years.
Spacing Effects
Finally, Anderson and Schooler (1991) examined how the spacing of contacts might 
predict future contact. Take two persons with whom you had the same number of contacts 
previously but for one person the contacts were spread out over time, whereas for the other 
the contacts were clumped together. The probability of contact soon after the last contact is 
higher for the latter, whereas the reverse is true for the probability of contact at longer lags 
after the last contact. This pattern can be visualized as follows. Assume that p is plotted as a 
function of recency of last contact (holding f constant), separately for massed (or clumped) 
contact (say, occurring on consecutive days) and spaced contacts (occurring days apart). At 
short recencies, p was higher for massed than for spaced contacts, but at longer recencies the 
pattern reversed (i.e., the lines crossed). To illustrate, assume you have met someone four 
times during the last month and the last encounter was only a few days ago. The chances are 
higher that you will see that person again if the four encounters occurred on consecutive days 
than if they occurred only once per week. If the last encounter was less recent, by contrast, the 
reverse is true: you will likely see that person again if the four encounters occurred only every 
week rather than if they occurred on consecutive days.
Taken together, these regularities suggest that the probability of having future contact 
with a person via email is highly predictable from how frequently and recently previous 
contacts occurred and how these contacts were distributed over time, paralleling results found 
for patterns of word usage. Crucially, the same systematic relationships to frequency, recency, 
and spacing also exist for memory performance (e.g., Cepeda, Vul, Rohrer, Wixted, & 
Pashler, in press; Glenberg, 1976; for an overview see Cepeda, Pashler, Vul, Wixted, & 
Rohrer, 2006). Specifically, memory performance for an item increases proportionally to the 
frequency with which the item has been studied; it decreases as a power function of how long 
it has been since the last study; and it is also affected in a characteristic way by the spacing of 
the study trials. Items learned through massed study (i.e., occurring in quick succession) tend 
to be more easily retrieved than items learned through spaced study (i.e., spread out over 
time) at short lags after the final study trial. In contrast, at longer lags, the picture reverses, 
such that items learned through spaced study tend to be better recalled than those learned 
through massed study. Thus, the performance function for items learned through massed 
study decays more quickly than the one for items learned through spaced study. 
Anderson and Schooler’s (1991) results indicate a correspondence between patterns in 
memory retrieval and patterns in which social information (word usage and email contacts) 
occur in the environment. Memory might thus be adaptive in the sense that it matches the 
availability of memory content to the needs posed by the environment. Given the frequency 
and importance of social information, the social environment may be a powerful force in 
shaping memory systems. 
Although Anderson and Schooler’s (1991) analysis of email contacts hints at 
regularities in social environments and, although these regularities are similar to those in other 
domains, it is unclear to what extent these results generalize. Are the regularities observed in 
email contacts representative of a broader structure of social communication that also includes 
face-to-face interactions, phone calls and other communication modes? After all, even for 
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heavy users, email communication makes up only about 25% of people’s social contacts 
(Copher, Kanfer, & Walker, 2002). The issues of whether regularities exist in social 
environments, how they can be described, and whether they match regularities in other 
domains (and, by implication, characteristics of memory performance) are important for a 
number of reasons. First, systematic patterns in the actual distribution of social encounters 
should have implications for analyses of strategies for social interactions, which often assume 
that contact between agents is equally probable. Second, to the extent that simple heuristics in 
the social world exploit a strong correspondence between patterns in memory performance 
and social encounters, studying the structures of social environments is informative for the 
study of simple heuristics.
Do the Regularities Also Exist in Social Contacts?
To examine the statistical structure of social contacts, we analyzed records of social 
contacts across a period of time. In contrast to Anderson and Schooler (1991), who considered 
only daily email, we also recorded contacts via face-to-face interactions, phone calls, and 
letters. The recorded contacts included being contacted (e.g., receiving a phone call), 
contacting others (e.g., giving someone a call), and unplanned encounters. The study involved 
the records of the daily contacts by one of us (TP) over 739 days. All results reported for this 
study were replicated in a study involving 40 participants who recorded their social contacts 
over a period of 100 days (Pachur, Schooler, & Stevens, 2010). Given the relatively long 
study period, our goal was to make record keeping manageable by striking a balance between 
the reliability and the level of detail of the records. Therefore, social contact was defined as 
all face-to-face or phone conversations lasting at least five minutes and all communication 
conveyed electronically or on paper of at least 100 words in length—thus only rather 
“intense” contacts were recorded. In addition, we tracked only whether a contact with a 
particular person occurred on a particular day, but not the length and the medium of contact, 
nor the direction of contact (i.e., which side initiated it), or how many contacts with a person 
occurred on each day (but see Pachur et al., 2010, who found that the results hold across 
different communication channels—such as face-to-face, phone, and email—and 
independently of the direction of contact).
Contacts were recorded in an electronic diary. Over the period of 739 days, contacts 
with 351 different persons were recorded, with an average of 7.04 contacts per day (SD = 
3.72), ranging between 1 and 23. Figure 1a shows that the distribution of probability of con-
tact (defined as the proportion of days in which a contact occurred) across network members 
was highly skewed: Although for some network members contact probability was very high, 
such network members were extremely rare. For most members of TP’s network, the proba-
bility of contact during the study period was smaller than 5% on any given day. The median 
probability of contact was 0.4% and the probability was 20% or higher for only 1.1% of TP’s 
network members (4 out of 351). Figure 1b plots the data as a cumulative distribution func-
tion—that is, it shows for the different levels of contact probability p, the proportion of net-
work members with contact probability p or larger. The distribution is very well captured by a 
power function (R2 = 0.99), which, in the log-log plot, yields a straight line.2 The estimated 
value for power exponent α in the noncumulative distribution was 1.62. Interestingly, our 
finding of a power-law distribution for the probability of contact (i.e., the strength of connec-
tions in a network) mirrors what has been found for the distributions of the number of connec-
tions in many natural networks, such as semantic, computer, or protein networks. For in-
stance, Barabási and Albert (1999) observed that the connections are usually not distributed 
uniformly among all nodes. Instead, only few nodes have a very large number of connections 
2 Although Pachur et al. (2010) also observed highly skewed distributions of contact probability in their study of 
40 participants’ social contacts, the majority of their participants were best described by an exponential function. 
An exponential function fitted TP’s data worse than a power function (R2 = 0.97).
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to other nodes (so-called “hubs’), whereas the large majority of nodes have only a moderate 
number of connections.
Clearly, our data suggest that frequent contact occurs with only a very small number of 
network members, yet with most members contact is relatively rare. In addition, contacts 
often occur in clusters across time. For illustration, Figure 1c shows the contact patterns of the 
20 network members with the most contacts across the period of 739 days. For some network 
members the contacts are spread out relatively equally, whereas for others they occur in 
clusters. That is, several days without contact are interspersed with days with very frequent 
contacts. As we will see shortly, differences in how contacts are distributed can influence 
contact probability. 
Can we predict future contact based on aspects of past contact? Specifically, are there 
similar regularities in contact strength in terms of how the frequency, recency, and spacing of 
past contact influence the probability of future contacts? To answer these questions, we 
conducted the following analyses. For the effect of frequency, we determined those network 
members with whom, in a time window of w days, f contacts occurred and calculated the 
proportion for which a contact occurred on day w + 1. For the effect of recency, we 
determined those network members with whom, in a time window of w days, the last contact 
occurred r days ago and calculated the proportion for which a contact occurred on day w + 1. 
For all analyses, we used a time window of w = 30 days. 
Frequency Effects
In what way is the probability of interacting with a person related to the number of 
previous contacts with the person? We calculated the probability that a contact occurred to a 
person on the 31st day as a function of the number of contacts with that person in the 
preceding 30 days. Figure 2a shows the probability of contact depending on the number of 
previous contacts. We find that probability of contact increases linearly with the frequency of 
previous contacts, p = -0.01 + 0.03f (R2 = 0.94). In other words, the pattern found by Anderson 
and Schooler (1991) for email contact generalizes extremely well to a broader range of 
interactions: the frequency of past contact predicts the probability of future contact. 
Recency Effects
As a further step, we asked how the probability of having contact with a network 
member relates to the recency of the last contact with the person. Figure 2b shows the odds of 
contact, o (= [p/(1-p)]), as a function of the recency of the last contact, with both variables 
plotted on a log scale.3 We again find a highly systematic relationship, with a linear fit 
implying a power relationship between the untransformed data. In fact, the untransformed 
data are well described by the power function o = 0.46 r-0.97 (R2 = 0.91). Figure 2b, however, 
also reveals some systematic deviations from the power function, with the probability of 
contact spiking at r = 7, 14, 21, and 28 (indicated by arrows). The location of these spikes 
suggests that they reflect weekly cycles in human activity. 
Combined Frequency and Recency Effects
The last contact with a person we have encountered often will have occurred, on 
average, more recently than the last contact with a person we contacted only rarely; frequency 
and recency (i.e., the number of days since last contact) of contact are thus correlated. In our 
data, this correlation was r = -0.25—that is, the higher the number of past contacts, the lower 
the number of days since last contact.4 To disentangle the influence of recency and frequency 
we analyzed the relation between the probability of contact and recency separately for 
3 Note that Anderson and Schooler (1991) proposed that this “retention curve” is well described by a negatively 
accelerated power function, Y = X-α. As power functions are unbounded above, Y cannot be a bounded measure, 
such as probability of contact. Therefore, we used odds instead, which are unbounded above like a power 
function.
4 To compute this correlation, we determined for each 5,052 times that contact with someone occurred, the 
number of days since the last contact as well as the number of contacts to that person in the time window. 
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different frequencies of contact. Figure 2c shows the probability of contact as a function of 
recency for network members with high frequency of contact (defined as 6-15 contacts in the 
previous 30 days) and those with low frequency of contact (1-5 contacts). We find similar 
patterns irrespective of the number of past contacts (although, of course, the contact 
probability was higher for high frequency contacts). In other words, for different contact 
frequencies, the decay parameter of the corresponding recency curves is similar. The best 
fitting functions were o = 0.26r-0.77 (R2 = 0.96), and o = 2.22r-1.19 (R2 = 0.87) for low and high 
frequencies, respectively. 
Spacing Effects 
As a last step, we turn to a more subtle predictor of social interaction: the spacing of past 
contacts. For the purpose of this analysis, we selected cases with exactly two contacts (f = 2) 
in the past 30 days and considered the probability of contact on the 31st day. We distinguished 
two spacing patterns: massed contacts, defined as cases in which the two contacts occurred on 
two consecutive days (short lag); and spaced contacts, defined as cases with a lag between the 
two contacts of between 2 and 28 days (long lag). In Figure 2d, the probability of contact is 
plotted as a function of recency, separately for massed and spaced contacts (results were 
robust when higher values of f were used). The probability of contact was analyzed as a 
function of recency of last contact using running averages and binned according to the 
following scheme. The data points for days 3 through 28 are running averages over five-day 
bins, including data from the two preceding and the two subsequent days (e.g., the running 
average for day 3 was computed as the average over the days 1-5). Days 2 and 29 are running 
averages over three-day bins, and days 1 and 30 are moving windows over one-day bins.
How would the probability of contact vary as a function of the recency of contact for 
massed and spaced contacts, respectively? Figure 2d shows that, as expected, there was an 
interaction between recency of last contact and how past contacts were distributed over time, 
indicated by the lines for massed and spaced contacts crossing. At short recencies, the 
probability of contact is higher for massed than for spaced contacts. At longer recencies, 
however, the pattern reverses. Between 5 and 23 days since last contact, the probability of 
contact tends to be higher for network members with spaced contact than for those with 
massed contact. Note that we thus find that social contact displays regularities that mirror 
spacing effects found for memory: at short lags, memory is better for items learned through 
massed rather than spaced study; at long lags the reverse is true. This parallel might be taken 
to indicate that our memories encode the statistics of the world—social and nonsocial alike—
to make information available according to the dictates of these statistics.
In sum, our analyses show that the probability of future contact (a) is highly skewed 
across the people one knows—contact is likely with only very few network members, and (b) 
follows systematically from the frequency, recency, and spacing of past social contacts. All of 
these findings were replicated in the study involving 40 participants (Pachur et al., 2010). The 
statistical structure of social contacts thus shares important characteristics with patterns of 
word usage in language and with patterns of email contacts (Anderson & Schooler, 1991). 
This suggests that efficient information retrieval systems operating in these domains may 
require similar designs. For instance, mobile phones and other communication systems could 
gain efficiency by making phone numbers and email addresses available as a function of not 
only frequency and recency but the spacing of past contacts as well.
What Mechanisms Might Generate the Structures in Social Environments?
The observation that social environments display strong regularities begs the question of 
which mechanisms might generate them. For instance, take the highly skewed distribution in 
the probabilities of contact, where frequent contacts occur only with a very small group of 
network members (Figure 1a). Given that this distribution displays some characteristics of a 
power-law distribution (Figure 1b) one might consider the Yule process as one candidate (cf. 
Newman, 2005; Simon, 1955). The Yule process has been proposed as an explanation for 
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power laws in domains such as city sizes (Simon, 1955), paper citations (Price, 1976), and 
links to pages on the World Wide Web (Barabási & Albert, 1999). The basic idea, often 
termed a “the-rich-get-richer process” or also “Matthew effect’, is that if an entity has more of 
some property (e.g., money, citations, population), it will tend to gain proportionally more of 
this property as compared to an entity with less. The Yule process, which yields a power-law 
distribution, is certainly reasonable in the context of social contact. Applied in the context of 
social contacts, a Yule process would yield a power-law distribution when three conditions 
are met. First, new members are, on occasion, added to your social network. Second, in 
between the addition of one new network member and the next, you have further contacts 
with your network members and for each, there is some probability that she will be the next 
person with whom you have contact. Third, the probability that you will have contact with a 
network member is proportional to the frequency of past contact. Figure 2a, which shows that 
for our study the probability of contact is proportional to frequency of past contact, appears to 
support this last condition. 
But not only is this proportionality condition empirically supported, it also makes 
intuitive sense. Each time you see someone there is some probability that you will arrange a 
future meeting. Each time someone sends you an email there is some probability that you will 
correspond again. Simon (1955) suggested that the generality of these conditions explains 
why power-law distributions are so common. The Yule process also underlies Barabási and 
Albert’s (1999) preferential growth model of scale-free network structures:5 hubs exist 
because new contacts attach preferentially to nodes having many contacts already.
Mind and Environment: What Causes What?
The observed correspondence between the structure of the environment and 
characteristics in memory performance begs the question of causality: are characteristics of 
memory due to the structure of the environment, or is the environmental structure due to 
characteristics of memory? The evolutionary biologist Lewontin (1983; see also Brandon, 
1996; Laland, Odling-Smee, & Feldman, 2000) distinguished two ways of understanding the 
relation of organisms to their environments: an adaptationist view and a contructivist view. In 
the adaptationist view, the environment molds species by posing problems for them to solve. 
Anderson and Schooler’s (1991) analysis of the New York Times headlines exemplifies an 
adaptationist analysis, as a headline reader has no influence over what appears there and thus 
passively experiences the environment (Schooler, Serio-Silva, & Rhine, 2010). In the 
constructionist view, by contrast, organisms both are shaped by their environments and also 
actively shape them. As Lewontin puts it, organisms “create a statistical pattern of 
environment different from the pattern in the external world. Organisms, by their life 
activities, can damp oscillations, for example in food supply by storage, or temperature by 
changing their orientation or moving” (Lewontin, p. 281). In an analysis of verbal interactions 
of preschool children (Anderson & Schooler, 1991), what a child said in one utterance 
influenced what she would hear in the future. We argue that in our analysis of social contacts 
a constructivist view is more appropriate than an adaptationist view. TP’s memory—through 
his actions—influences whom he contacts and the contacts he receives, in turn, influence 
which memory traces are made available. A striking aspect of the findings for constructed 
environments is that even though the person is actively shaping them (rather than simply 
responding passively to them), the same robust statistical regularities emerge as for the 
passively experienced New York Times. Thus, for the purposes here, we need not have a 
strong model of the direction of causality, because similar patterns emerge with and without 
feedback from the agent to the environment. Similarly, Pachur et al. (2010) observed the same 
regularities in contact probability irrespective of which side initiated the contact.
5In scale-free networks, the connectivity distribution—that is, the number of nodes that have a particular number 
of connections to other nodes—follows a power law.
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Social Structure and Simple Heuristics
If, as our results suggest, the social world displays robust statistical structures, these 
structures may influence how well simple heuristics perform in this world and eventually also 
which heuristics developed in the first place. Moreover, given the correspondence between 
systematic patterns in the social environment and those in memory performance, regularities 
in social contacts should be reflected in the ease with which information about these contacts 
are retrieved from memory. As a consequence, simple heuristics might exploit this statistical 
structure via memory. In this section, we consider these possibilities. We briefly describe one 
example of a simple heuristic for cooperation and then consider how the structure of social 
environments might affect the performance of this and other heuristics. We first give an 
overview of research focused on the influence of network structure (e.g., small-world 
characteristics, scale-free networks) on the performance of simple heuristics. We then 
elaborate on how regularities in the contact strength and contact dynamics might influence the 
performance of simple heuristics. In addition, we discuss the implications for how social 
distance—which is related to social connectedness—influences willingness to cooperate. 
Evolution of Cooperation
Imagine two thieves are caught by police after a heist. They are immediately separated 
from each other, and each is given the following deal: testify against your partner to reduce 
your sentence. If the other guy testifies against you, then choosing to testify results in fewer 
years behind bars. If the other guy does not testify, choosing to testify once again reduces the 
time in prison. No matter what the other guy does, individuals have an incentive to cheat the 
opponent, even though their combined time in prison would be minimized by both choosing 
not to rat each other out. This game is called the prisoner’s dilemma (dubbed the “E. coli of 
social psychology”, Axelrod, 1984, p. 28) and models cooperation when a sizable temptation 
to defect (i.e., not cooperate) exists (chapter 12; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). In the 
prisoner’s dilemma, one-sided cooperation (in this example, not testifying against your 
partner) always results in lower benefits for an individual than defecting (i.e., testifying), but 
mutual cooperation yields the largest total group benefit (Figure 3). If defecting is always 
beneficial for an individual, how could we ever expect cooperation to evolve?
A number of general mechanisms have been proposed that can lead to cooperation in 
the prisoner’s dilemma. Though some of them, such as kin selection, apply to one-shot 
situations, most mechanisms apply to the repeated game (iterated prisoner’s dilemma). Trivers 
(1971) proposed reciprocal altruism (here referred to simply as reciprocity) as one key 
account for the evolution of cooperation in repeated interactions. In reciprocity, cooperating is 
contingent on previous cooperation by your partner. A simple heuristic that implements 
reciprocity is tit-for-tat (TFT): start by cooperating, and then copy your partner’s previous 
choice (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). Using TFT only requires memory of the partner’s most 
recent response (but see Stevens & Hauser, 2004). 
Crucially for our present purpose, a critical variable for TFT to evolve is the 
probability of encountering someone again in the future, P (Axelrod and Hamilton used the 
variable w, poetically dubbed “the shadow of the future”). Specifically, TFT can outperform 
pure defection as long as P > c/b, where c represents the cost of cooperating and b represents 
the benefit from receiving the altruistic act (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006). Thus, 
although TFT itself focuses on past behavior, the conditions under which the strategy can 
evolve depend on the probability of future interaction.
The P > c/b rule for TFT is derived using the standard evolutionary game theoretic 
analysis of cooperation. This analysis, however, relies on rather strict and unrealistic 
assumptions about interaction patterns between players. In particular, it assumes a well-mixed 
population in which every player has an equal chance to play against (i.e., interact with) every 
other player (Maynard Smith, 1982). Under these conditions, small group sizes and many 
interactions are required for TFT to be successful. As research on the small world 
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phenomenon and our contact study have revealed, however, interaction patterns in real 
networks often display regularities that contradict these assumed conditions. For instance, we 
found that the distribution of contact probability is not uniform across players. This insight 
has important implications for understanding the performance of heuristics—and heuristics 
for cooperation are no exception. In the following, we first review how network structure 
influences cooperation and then consider the role of contact probability.
Cooperation and network structure. The assumption in evolutionary game theory that 
every player has an equal chance to play against every other player emphasizes only pair-wise 
interactions. Social network analysis, by contrast, embeds these pair-wise interactions in a 
larger matrix of interactions, with possible synergistic effects.6 How is the evolution of 
cooperation influenced by the structure of networks, which vary in how individual network 
members are connected? In Table 1 we consider three types of network structures: regular, 
small-world, and scale-free networks (Newman, 2003; Watts, 2004). In regular networks, 
each agent interacts only with a fixed set of neighbors, typically nearby in space. When agents 
interact in local clusters with the same number of other partners, stable cooperation can exist 
using the simplest heuristic: always cooperate (Nowak & May, 1992; Ohtsuki, Hauert, 
Lieberman, & Nowak, 2006). For this unconditional cooperation, no memory or recognition 
of the partner’s strategy is needed (although regular spatial structure stabilizes TFT as well; 
Pollock, 1989). 
Although unconditional cooperation and TFT can evolve in regular networks, they do 
not represent a very realistic social structure. No one interacts solely with his or her 
neighbors. Watts and Strogatz (1998) added an interesting twist to the assumption of a fixed 
number of contacts in regular networks. By “rewiring” a few of the connections—that is, 
breaking the connection with one network member and randomly assigning it to another—
shortcuts across the network are generated. In this structure, members interact primarily with 
their neighbors but sometimes have connections with more distant members (for a similar 
treatment of imposing shocks on neighborhood structures, see chapter 15). As mentioned 
above, Watts and Strogatz showed that this structure gives rise to the small-world 
characteristics that Milgram (1967) observed in his classic study; namely that the average 
number of connections between agents in a network is rather small. The high level of 
clustering in regular graphs allows cooperation to be maintained, and cooperation is even 
maintained when a small number of random connections are added. Increasing the number of 
random connections between members, however, degrades the evolution of cooperation 
(Masuda & Aihara, 2003; Watts, 1999). The likely reason is that the introduction of defectors 
through these random connections inhibits cooperation from gaining a strong foothold in 
small worlds. 
Although small-world networks provide a more realistic pattern of interaction for social 
networks than regular networks, Barabási and Albert (1999) found evidence for an interesting 
subclass of small-world networks: scale-free networks. In the original formulation of small-
world networks, all agents have the same number of connections (like in a regular graph). 
Scale-free networks, by contrast, have a power-law distribution of a number of connections—
that is, some members have a very large number of connections (“hubs”), whereas others have 
only a few. Although not all small-world networks have scale-free characteristics (Amaral, 
Scala, Barthélémy, & Stanley, 2000), some do (e.g., sexual contact networks; Liljeros, Edling, 
Amaral, Stanley, & Aberg, 2001).
Importantly, Santos, Rodrigues, and Pacheco (2006) showed that the evolution of 
cooperation is influenced by whether a network displays scale-free characteristics or not. 
6 Social network analysis allows for the evaluation of the influence of connections beyond the target member. 
For instance, one can explore not only individual A’s interactions with B and C but also B and C’s interactions 
with each other. Depending on the networks structure, B and C may or may not interact, which can influence the 
payoffs of cooperation.
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Specifically, unconditional cooperation was more stable in scale-free networks than in regular 
networks, even with large temptations to cheat. Once hubs were occupied by cooperators, 
defectors had difficulty spreading. In addition, Santos et al. showed that cooperation was 
greatly facilitated by network growth (i.e., the size of the network increased at each time step) 
and preferential attachment (because it allows cooperators that are hubs to make more 
connections and thus attract more cooperators). This probably also applies to the evolution of 
TFT, but we know of no studies examining this possibility.
Cooperation and probability of contact. Compared to the influence of network structure 
on cooperation, the influence of the distribution of contact probability (i.e., the connection 
strengths within a network) has so far received much less attention. Most analyses assume an 
equal probability of contact across all connections, and this also holds for most analyses of the 
iterated prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod, 1984; Maynard Smith, 1982). One of the key findings 
of these analyses was the identification of the algebraic conditions for sustaining TFT (i.e., P 
> c/b). 
Our analysis of probability of contact, however, suggests that the assumption that all 
agents face the same probability of interacting with each of the partners in their network is not 
very realistic. Instead, we found that individuals interact more with some network members 
than others. This has important implications for the evolution of cooperation in real social 
networks. Specifically, there will not be a single probability of future encounter, P, but an 
individual probability for each partner Pi (where i indexes each partner or class of partners). 
Our data allow us to calculate realistic values for the average P as well as P’s distribution 
(e.g., Figure 1a) and to explore how TFT performs under these more realistic conditions. In 
our analysis, the average P was about 0.02. With such low probability of contact the benefits 
of cooperation need to exceed the costs by a ratio of at least 50:1.7 As this benefit-to-cost ratio 
may not exist in many real interactions, a skewed distribution of contact probability limits the 
evolution of TFT and, by extension, the evolution of the whole class of strategies that depend 
on repeated interactions to succeed. 
But if TFT is unlikely to lead to cooperation with low probabilities of contact, how to 
account for the emergence of cooperation? There are two possibilities. The first is to leave the 
class of strategies that require a minimum number of interactions and investigate the 
emergence of cooperation with strategies like Win-Stay, Lose-Shift (or Pavlov; Kraines & 
Kraines, 1989; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993) under a realistic distribution of contact probability. 
Alternatively, we can stay in the TFT family but build in sensitivity to differences in the 
probability of contact. For instance, rather than always employing TFT, individuals may 
cooperate with a particular partner based on the probability of future interaction: cooperate if 
Pi > c/b. In this version, cooperation may emerge for the small subclass of frequently 
encountered partners, but not for others. Such an approach, however, raises the interesting 
question of what kinds of cues agents can use to predict the probability of future contact. 
Below, we explore how memory might serve as one such cue.
Social discounting. With the predictions from reciprocity in hand, we might expect that 
probability of future encounter will be a good predictor of cooperative behavior. That is, 
individuals may use a strategy such as “help those with whom I interact frequently”. Under 
the assumption that social distance (defined as the perceived distance between individuals in 
other social groups) is highly associated with probability of contact, Jones and Rachlin’s 
(2006) results confirm this prediction. These authors measured cooperativeness by how much 
money people would forgo to share with another person as a function of the social distance to 
that person. As it turned out, cooperativeness decreased with social distance as a hyperbolic 
7 If P > c/b and P = 0.02, then 0.02 > c/b, that is, the ratio of benefits to costs needs to exceed 50:1. When the 
median or mode probability (median = 0.004; mode = 0.001) are used, the critical threshold for the benefit-to-
cost ratio increases to 250:1 and 1000:1, respectively.
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function (which is a special case of a power-law function). That is, cooperativeness dropped 
off steeply at short social distances, but the rate of decrease slowed at larger social distances. 
Interestingly, the highly skewed distribution of probability of contact that we observed 
(see Figure 1a) might offer an explanation of the particular form of the relationship between 
cooperativeness and social distance (assuming that social distance and probability of contact 
are correlated). To appreciate the argument, it is important to note that Jones and Rachlin 
(2006) defined the social distance of a person as the rank of that person among “the 100 
people closest to you” (p. 284). The hyperbolic discounting function could result from the fact 
that the social distance between, say the closest and the 5th closest person is much larger than 
between the 20th and the 25th closest person. As a consequence, social discounting might not 
follow a hyperbolic, but a linear function when social distance is not measured by rank but by 
probability of contact.
In summary, as for the role of network structure, cooperation can emerge in networks 
in which cooperators occur in clusters. Notably, cooperation occurs in regular networks in 
which the same individuals interact repeatedly, as well as in scale-free networks in which 
hubs are occupied by cooperators. A large number of random connections (as in standard 
small worlds), by contrast, seems to inhibit cooperation because defectors can invade the 
clusters. As for the role of probability of contact our data suggest, first, that the assumptions 
underlying existing models of cooperation do not reflect realistic structures in interaction 
patterns. In other words, evolutionary models of cooperation need to be reformulated based on 
actual interaction patterns. Second, our results show that the probability of future contact is 
quite low for most partners, which has particular implications for the feasibility of TFT. In 
fact, the standard version of TFT likely will not fare well in an environment with highly 
skewed distributions of contacts (and this probably applies to the entire class of strategies that 
require a minimum number of interactions with partners). Cooperation might still emerge with 
a version of TFT that is sensitive to the probabilities of future contact with different partners. 
Strategies such as “always cooperate with partners with whom I interact frequently” (e.g., 
friends, relatives, co-workers) may perform well in real social networks because they exploit 
important aspects of the interactions such as the frequency, recency, and spacing of contacts. 
This intuition is confirmed in an analysis of cooperativeness with individuals varying in social 
distance—socially “close” individuals (presumably those with high probability of contact) 
receive more cooperative benefits. In other words, probability of future contact might be a key 
variable in an individual’s decision of whether to cooperate with another person or not. But 
how could a boundedly rational agent judge the probability of future contact? In the next 
section, we discuss how a memory system that reflects the statistical patterns in social contact 
can be exploited by simple heuristics.
Memory-Based Heuristics for Cooperation
Evolutionary models of cooperation typically ignore the cognitive building blocks that 
are required to implement strategies for cooperation (Stevens & Hauser, 2004). These 
building blocks include individual recognition, quantification, delayed gratification, and 
inhibitory control, to name a few. For our purposes, the temporal delay between interactions 
requires an ability to recall the previous behavior of partners. How might memory affect 
cooperation?
The influence of memory on the performance of simple heuristics is illustrated, for 
instance, in a study by Aktipis (2006). Using evolutionary simulations, she considered various 
heuristics for deciding whether to cooperate with another agent and tested them in terms of 
their ability to invade (i.e., evolve to be the majority) a population of defectors. The heuristics 
she tested were simply based on recognition of whether an agent had been encountered before 
or not. Aktipis distinguished between heuristics that only stored agents who defected at 
previous encounters and those that only stored agents that cooperated. In addition, she 
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manipulated memory size by varying the number of previously encountered agents stored (cf. 
chapter 15). One key finding was that a heuristic that stores only cooperators (but not 
defectors) could invade a population of defectors, but only when memory was extremely 
small. Specifically, the heuristic was successful if only the first cooperator (i.e., a memory 
size of one) was stored. Importantly, note that this heuristic is highly conservative: it leads to 
cooperation with only one single agent—namely the one stored in memory. In light of our 
result that contact probability is highly skewed and frequent contacts occur with only a very 
small group of network members, such a highly selective heuristic may approximate, to some 
degree, the structure of actual social environments. In other words, even if an individual is 
embedded in a large social network, cooperation with only a very small number of network 
members may be appropriate if the environment is structured such that most (and frequently 
repeated) interactions occur with only very few individuals. 
Aktipis (2006) used a rather crude memory model. Might a more nuanced one, in 
which memory performance is responsive to statistical regularities of past social encounters, 
suggest ways in which heuristics can exploit memory? As an example, consider the culture 
and ritual associated with the buying of rounds in an English pub (Fox, 1996). Essentially, in 
the latter case, drinks are purchased in rounds, where one member of the group buys the 
round, but the expectation is that the other members will pick up a round later that evening or 
farther in the future. Suppose you enter a bar filled with beer drinkers and must decide how to 
optimize your round buying. Your only concern is your future consumption of drinks, so all 
you want is to find a person whom you will likely meet again. Basically, you need to think 
about how long is the period in the future L in which you have a reasonable chance of seeing 
your bar mate again. This could be over your lifetime (e.g., if you are a regular) or just a few 
days (e.g., if you are at a conference). What is the probability you will see her again in the 
future? Suppose it is Monday and you will be leaving town on Wednesday morning. Then, in 
this simplest case, where L = 1, pL=1 = pTue, that is, the relevant probability consists only of the 
probability that you will see her on Tuesday. If L = 2 (i.e., you will be leaving on Thursday 
morning), then the relevant probability is the sum of the probability that you will see her on 
Tuesday, and the probability that you will see her on Wednesday, but not on Tuesday: pL=2 = 
pTue + pWed (1 - pTue). Generalizing this to periods of length L, yields:
P L=∑
i=1
L
p i∏
j=1
i−1
(1−p j ) . (1)
PL is thus the probability of encountering the person at least once sometime during period L. 
As we have shown in our analyses of social contact, the probability p of having contact with 
someone will not be constant, but vary as a function of our history of contacts with that 
person. These probabilities will depend, on a first approximation, on how frequently and 
recently we have seen someone, as shown in Figures 2a and 2b. But is it reasonable to assume 
that a person, or any animal for that matter, could calculate, or even approximate, PL? 
Probably not. In the next section, we explore how to exploit the memory system, envisioned 
in the ACT-R cognitive architecture, to achieve something that approximates the calculation 
in Equation 1. 
Using memory activation to predict future encounters. The ACT-R research program 
(Anderson, Bothell, Byrne, Douglass, Lebiere, & Qin, 2004; Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) 
strives to develop an encompassing theory of cognition, specified to such a degree that 
phenomena from perceptual search to the learning of algebra might be modeled within the 
same framework. The core of ACT-R is constituted by a procedural system, consisting of 
rules that describe the cognitive steps needed to carry out a given procedure, and a declarative 
memory system for facts. The declarative memory system consists of records that represent 
information (e.g., about the outside world, about oneself, etc.). These records take on 
activations that predict whether information will be needed to achieve a processing goal, such 
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as recalling the name of someone you have just encountered at a conference. Activation is 
reflected in the accessibility of memory records, that is, whether and how quickly they can be 
retrieved. In other words, these activations reflect the “need probability”—the probability of 
needing a particular piece of information—from a rational analysis of memory (e.g., 
Anderson & Milson, 1989), and thus the kinds of social contact statistics we found are quite 
relevant.
Activation, A, corresponds to the log odds (i.e., ln[p/(1–p)]) that the record in memory 
will be needed to achieve a processing goal. A record’s activation is calculated as the sum of 
the base-level strength of the record and the activation that the record receives from the 
current context. For our purpose, however, we ignore context, and activation is thus simply 
the base rate activation rooted in the environmental pattern of occurrence.8 Specifically, Ai is 
determined by an equation that strengthens and decays a record’s activation according to the 
pattern with which it has been used. 
Ai=ln(∑
k=1
n t k
−d)=ln( p1− p ) , (2)
where the record has been encountered n times in the past at lags of t1, t2,…, tn. . Finally, d is a 
decay parameter that captures the amount of forgetting in declarative memory, thus 
determining how much information about an item’s environmental frequency is retained in 
memory. Figure 4a illustrates how activation builds and decays. Suppose that you see bar 
mate Norm9 on January 6th and not again until January 11th. In this case the activation of the 
memory record for Norm would decay away in the interim. From the 11th on, the activation 
contributed by the second meeting would be added to the activation remaining from the first 
meeting, to give the total activation.10
How would memory of social contacts be represented in this system? And how could 
the calculation of PL (i.e., the probability that one will have contact with a particular person in 
the future) be derived directly from the activation of a memory trace about a social contact? 
Keeping in mind that A is the log-odds of needing a record of having had previous contact 
with someone, and that p = o/(1+o), then the probability of needing a record, p, is
p= e
A
1+e A
(3)
and so, 
1− p= 1
1+e A
 (4)
Substituting Equations 3 and 4 into Equation 1 yields, 
P L=∑
i=1
L e A i
1+eA i
∏
j=1
i−1 1
1+eA j
. (5)
Equation 5 suggests that if it were possible to project activation into the future, we 
could use activation of a memory record of someone to estimate the probability of contact 
with that person during the next L time units, PL. Recall that this probability is critical for 
whether an individual should play TFT in a prisoner’s dilemma. Given that the system does 
not have direct access to a calculation, such as Equation 6, one possibility would be to use 
8 Although we ignore contextual information in this chapter, here is how it could enter the picture. If, for 
example, Friday is Cliff’s regular day to go to the pub, information about the day of the week could be used to 
boost slightly information associated with Norm, thus making activation sensible to context information. Note 
that this would reflect the weekly cycles apparent in Figure 2b.
9 Norm and Cliff were bar flies in the popular television series Cheers.
10 In ACT-R, it is not possible to access sub-symbolic quantities like activation directly. Rather, these must be 
gauged by whether and how quickly a memory record can be retrieved (Hertwig, Herzog, Schooler, & Reimer, 
2008; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). For our purposes, we will suppose that there is some transformation of 
activation, A, into a sensation of fluency or familiarity, such that if Ai > Aj then, f(Ai) > f(Aj).
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current activation as proxy for future activation. Although such a strategy might often be 
successful, Figure 4b illustrates how it can lead to systematic errors. Suppose that you meet 
bar mate Cliff for the first time on January 26th, and then you meet both Norm and Cliff on the 
28th. On the 28th, Cliff will be more familiar (ACliff = 0.53) than Norm (ANorm = 0.44), so you 
would buy Cliff a beer, assuming d is set to ACT-R’s default value of .5. However, projecting 
out into the future that activation for each suggests that you are more likely to see Norm than 
Cliff again. Cross-overs like this are also reflected in the statistics of Figure 2c (which were 
due to differences in the spacing of contacts) and represent a strong regularity in the memory 
literature known as Jost’s Law (Jost, 1897): If two memories are of equal accessibility now, 
the older memory will be relatively more accessible in the future. 
This analysis shows that if we assume that the familiarity experienced with some person 
represents some function of memory activation, this familiarity may not be a reliable indicator 
of the probability of future encounters. You may be more likely to encounter someone again 
in the future who is less familiar now than someone else who is more familiar. Even though 
the memory system (at least within in the ACT-R framework) has the needed information 
encoded, familiarity alone does not suffice to reliably predict the probability of future contact. 
Adding only a little information beyond familiarity, however, may help. For instance, if two 
people are equally familiar to a person but she remembers that the last contact for one of them 
was more distant in the past than for the other, she could correctly predict that her probability 
of contact is higher for the person with the less recent last contact. Nevertheless, we do not 
mean to imply that using familiarity as the basis of heuristics to predict future encounters 
could not be effective. How well such a heuristic will work depends on details both about the 
statistics of the social environment and how memory works. For example, familiarity might 
be a reliable indicator of probability of contactin the short run (i.e., small L) but not for 
probability of contact in the long run (i.e., large L). It is currently unclear what mechanisms 
people actually use to judge the probability of future contact with a particular person. Our 
analyses, however, might help to identify these mechanisms. If people relied primarily on 
familiarity to make that judge contact probabilities, then their judgments would display 
predictable, systematic errors. If people steered clear of familiarity-based errors, this would 
suggest that they incorporate additional cues, such as recency or frequency information, in 
their judgments. 
In sum, the probability of encountering a particular network member again in the future 
represents key information for deciding whether to cooperate with her or not. This probability 
is more or less encoded in the relative activation of memory records formed by past 
encounters with the person. Memory thus offers a valuable resource to be exploited for 
making key social decisions. The catch is that predicting, based on activation alone, which 
person you are more likely to encounter in the future may, in predictable ways, lead you 
astray.
Conclusions and Outlook
“We learn that the target person is not surrounded by acquaintance points, each of which 
is equally likely to feed into an outside contact; rather, there appear to be highly popular 
channels for the transmission of the chain”. Thus concludes Stanley Milgram (1967, p. 66) 
from an often overlooked result of his classic study of the small-world phenomenon. In this 
chapter, we reported evidence that a skewed distribution in the usage of a person’s contact 
channels characterizes social contact more generally. We live in a small world not only 
because we can reach a large number of people in a small number of steps, but also our daily 
encounters are concentrated on a very small number of people. We have argued that this 
skewed pattern in the probability of contact is particularly relevant for the evolution of 
cooperation. Most existing models of cooperation ignore contact patterns, but our results 
suggest that they may have strong influences on cooperation. In particular, the evolution of 
the simple heuristic TFT may be quite limited when the probability of interaction is skewed. 
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Further, we found systematic relationships between aspects of past encounters and the 
probability of future encounters. These patterns mirror results found in other forms of social 
interaction (word usage, email contact), and, intriguingly, they show characteristics that have 
also been found in patterns of memory performance. Based on this correspondence, we have 
highlighted ways in which social heuristics might exploit memory to organize the distribution 
of cooperative behavior, as well as the constraints associated with such social heuristics. 
Social contacts provide the infrastructure for social exchange and social transmission. 
Our results should therefore be relevant for a number of areas beyond the evolution of 
cooperation. For instance, the influence of connection strength and network contact dynamics 
has implications for models of the transmission of viruses, fads, and social information. Like 
cooperation, the study of cultural transmission focuses mainly on the network structure, 
neglecting the distribution of contacts. Yet the strength of connections may have important 
implications for transmission (Read, Eames, & Edmunds, 2008). Concerning the role of 
memory for predicting the probability of future contact, our results highlight the importance 
of testing the accuracy of memory to predict future social contact, as well as the relative 
importance of the various aspects of past contacts—frequency, recency, and spacing—in 
predicting the chance of meeting someone again. In short, from patterns of memory to social 
interactions, the past is a powerful predictor of the future and determinant of the present.
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Tables
Table 1. Interaction patterns and cooperation in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. 
Pattern of 
interaction Definition Stability of cooperation
Network structure
Regular 
network
Agents exist on a spatial 
network in which they interact 
with a fixed neighborhood of 
partners.
Tit-for-tat (TFT) is stable with fixed 
partners1, and unconditional 
cooperation can evolve2.
Small-world 
network
Agents exist on a regular 
network in which a few 
connections are rewired outside 
of the local neighborhood.
A few random connections can support 
cooperation, but many random 
connections inhibit cooperation3,4.
Scale-free 
network
Agents differ in the number of 
partners with whom they 
interact.
Unconditional cooperation can evolve, 
due to both growth and preferential 
attachment5.
Probability of contact
Equal Agents interact equally often 
with all partners, either by 
playing repeatedly against the 
same partner or by playing with 
a randomly chosen partner.
Unconditional cooperation is not stable, 
but TFT may succeed with very low 
error rate6. 
Skewed Agents interact with different 
partners at different frequencies.
We do not know how a heterogeneous 
probability of contact will influence 
cooperation, but it likely will make 
unconditional cooperation and TFT 
difficult to implement.
Notes: 1Pollock, 1989; 2Nowak & May, 1992; 3Watts, 1999; 4Masuda & Aihara, 2003; 
5Santos, Rodrigues, & Pacheco, 2005; 6Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981.
Figure 14-1. Distribution of contacts across network members in the analysis of TP’s social
contacts. (a) The probability of contact with a particular network member on a given day is
highly skewed, with the large majority of members having a probability of less than 0.1. (b)
When the network members are ordered according to contact probability, the relationship
between rank and contact probability resembles a power-law distribution. (c) The pattern of
social contacts with various network members across a period of 739 days varies, some
showing a uniform or spaced pattern and other showing a clumped or massed pattern.
Figure 14-2. Regularities in social contact. (a) Probability of contact p is a linear function of
the frequency of past contacts f. (b-c) The odds of contact o is a power function of the number
of days since the last contact, r, appearing as a straight line on a log-log plot; even (as shown
in c) when f is taken into account. (d) p (shown as running average using a five-day bin size)
depends on both the number of days since the last contact and whether the past contact was
massed or spaced, holding f constant at two. The R2s in (b) and (c) refer to the fit of 
the log-transformed power (and thus linear) functions to the log-transformed data.
Sucker’s pay-offRewardCooperate
Player’s strategy
PunishmentTemptation to cheatDefect
DefectCooperate
Partner’s strategy
Figure 14-3: Payoff matrix for the prisoner’s dilemma. The player can choose to cooperate or 
defect (row strategies) at the same time that the partner chooses to cooperate or defect 
(column strategy). If both cooperate, the player receives R, the reward for cooperating. If both 
defect, the player receives P, the punishment for defection. If the player cooperates and the 
partner defects, the player receives S, the sucker’s payoff, and if the reverse is true, the player 
receives T, the temptation to cheat. A prisoner’s dilemma occurs if T > R > P > S. The best 
strategy is always to defect because, regardless of the partner’s strategy, defection yields a 
higher payoff than cooperation, regardless of whether the partner cooperates (T > R) or 
defects (P > S).
Figure 14-4: (a) Each encounter increases the activation of a memory record. The activation
of the individual encounters is represented by the thin black lines. The activation of the sum
of the two encounters is shown by the line punctuated by black dots. (b) Current levels of
activation do not perfectly predict future levels. On the 28th, Cliff will be more familiar than
Norm, but Norm’s higher future activation in March suggests that you will be more likely to
meet Norm in March than Cliff.
